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HOW many times have you been asked ‘How are you?’and, regardless of how you 
were actually feeling, replied with a simple
‘Fine’? Or asked someone ‘Are you OK?’,
and nodded whilst asking in order to
encourage a positive reply? Much of the
time the literal meaning of such questions
is submerged in the rituals of greeting, and
so a failure to address their literal content is
not treated as a breach of expectations
(Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998). But,
unremarkable as it may seem, is this habit
also a sign of our culture’s lack of concern
for emotional matters?
The popularity of talk shows such as
Trisha, the mass-marketing of books on
‘emotional intelligence’, and the manifold
ways in which the vocabulary and terms of
psychotherapy and counselling have
entered everyday life (see Parker, 1997), all
seem to indicate a new-found legitimation
of emotionality in our traditionally stiff-
upper-lipped culture. Nevertheless, it
appears that for many people emotional
expressivity is still problematic. For
example, it seems that the outburst of
public grief following the death of Princess
Diana may have also allowed many
individuals to grieve for losses in their own
lives that, until then, had not been fully
acknowledged. Suicides increased by 17
per cent in the month following the death
of Diana, and self-harm by a staggering 
44 per cent (Hawton et al., 2000).
Many sociologists and cultural critics
suggest that individualism has become
more prevalent in Western culture in recent
years (e.g. Baumann, 2000), creating what
Lasch (1979) calls a ‘culture of narcissism’,
in which people are dependent on various
forms of therapy as the everyday world has
become an atomised space of interpersonal
alienation. Increasingly, perhaps, we
imagine that the proper place for emotional
talk and reflection is the professionalised
and relatively costly space of the therapeutic
encounter. So should psychologists be
preaching the importance of expressing
and listening to emotional experiences
informally, with friends and family and 
in other types of discursive practice?
The evidence
A large body of studies in
psychoneuroimmunology suggest that there
are associations between the suppression of
negative emotional experiences and illness,
and the expression of negative emotional
experiences and health. For example,
Esterling, Antoni, Kumar et al. (1990,
1993) found that the inhibition of negative
affect in people with latent Epstein–Barr
virus (EBV) was related to higher levels of
EBV blood antibodies. The appearance of
EBV blood antibodies is related to EBV
reactivation, and an inability of the immune
system to keep the virus in check. They
also found that emotional disclosure
through writing or speaking modulates
latent EBV titres and so strengthens the
immune system (Esterling, Antoni, Fletcher
et al., 1994). Levy et al. (1985) found that
a repressive personality style is
significantly associated with poorer natural
killer (NK) cell activity. NK is an immune
function involved with the control of
tumours. Repressive coping styles, the
repression of negative emotions and a
repressive personality style are frequently
associated with cancer onset, progression,
malignancy and death from cancer (e.g.
Garssen & Goodkin, 1999; Gross, 1989;
Pettingale et al., 1987). In a 10-year study
Spiegel (1990) found that supportive-group
intervention prolonged the survival time of
cancer patients compared with a control
group.
Such evidence clearly suggests that
emotional expression is positively
associated with good health. Yet, as is often
the case in matters psychological, things
are not necessarily that simple. Pennebaker
and Frances (1996) followed a group of
college students as they disclosed their
feelings about being in college for half an
hour on three consecutive days. Compared
with the control group, a significant
majority of the group did have better
health. However out of 35 students in the
experimental group, nine became healthier,
21 had no change and five students’ health
actually deteriorated. 
Attempting to shed some light on this
finding, Bucci (1995) reanalysed the data
and found relationships between health
status and the form of narrative deployed 
in disclosure. Students whose health
deteriorated typically narrated their
experiences using abstract language with
little emotional tone, and had a propensity
to intellectualise their experiences. By
contrast, the narratives of those whose
health improved were typically high in
emotional tone. For example, consider the
difference between (a) ‘I wasn’t feeling too
good that day’ and (b) ‘On that day my
anxiety was so intense that I had a
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tightening feeling in my chest and head
began to ache’. Bucci and colleagues have
devised a measure, ‘referential activity’
(RA), to assess the degree of emotional
disclosure in narratives, focusing upon
clarity, concreteness, specificity and
imagery (see weblinks). They hypothesise
that RA is a measure of the degree of
connectivity between emotional and
conscious experience, and can assess the
extent to which individuals are consciously
giving meaning to their emotions. Studies
have shown that higher levels of RA in
disclosure narratives are associated with
better health outcomes (e.g. Bucci, 1993,
1995; Okie, 1992).
But why should those that did not
express themselves well tend to have worse
health, as opposed to no change? Recent
neuroscientific work addressing how we
actually feel emotion may help us to
understand this. Damasio (1995, 2000)
proposes that increasing familiarity with
emotionally arousing stimuli drives a
developmental process by which a person
eventually comes to understand that the
stimuli cause no imminent danger. In
neurophysiological terms, the stimuli no
longer excite the sympathetic nervous
system via what Damasio calls the ‘body
loop’ to produce somatic states that appear
as feedback in consciousness. Instead, they
inaugurate within the somatosensory
cortices a surrogate or ‘image’ of the body
in an excited state; Damasio calls this the
‘as-if body loop’. The feeling of the
emotion still arises, albeit in a paler form,
but the actual body state that would
accompany the feeling proper (e.g. changes
in the autonomic nervous system and motor
and endocrine systems) no longer occurs. 
Additionally, LeDoux (1996) has also
shown that implicit, non-conscious stimuli
can nevertheless produce a fear response,
stimulating the sympathetic nervous system
with possible negative consequences for
health. So it may be that individuals with
low RA, whose emotional narratives do not
explicitly and graphically connect to their
experiences, are nevertheless engaging in
implicit or non-conscious associative
processing that stimulates body state
changes. Their style of talking might
inhibit integration and movement from 
the body loop to the as-if body loop, whilst
nevertheless calling out fear responses that
place the body under stress and so make
them more prone to ill health.
Of course, it is always difficult to tell
how much a person is affected by non-
conscious emotionally laden stimuli, and
what consequences this has for their mental
and physical health. A century of
psychoanalysis has addressed this question,
but its claims and findings remain
controversial in psychology. Perhaps the
recent advent of neuropsychoanalysis
(Solms & Turnbull, 2002) and its
association with recent advances in
neuroscience will make some
psychoanalytic claims more respectable.
However, it is likely that any change in this
direction will be slow, since acknowledging
the importance of separate affective neural
subsystems would have many
consequences for psychology’s currently
predominant cognitive orientation.
From voyeurism to effective talk
So, is it good to talk? It seems to depend
on precisely how that talking is done.
Perhaps our therapeutic culture is
predominantly a voyeuristic one, more
interested in showing us other people
addressing their feelings. Maybe our media
encourages receptive yet passive emotional
engagement, where individuals watch these
practices ‘Big Brother style’ rather than
perform them. Consequently, the feelings
associated with our own tragedies and
achievements could be dampened down,
channelled into the surrogate experiences
of celebrating more glamorous lives or
ridiculing less attractive ones. The media
practice of high emotional expressivity
might not extend thoroughly to everyday
life, where harsher material circumstances
and everyday discursive practices may
combine, generating a tendency towards
lower RA at the same time as it encourages
reflection upon potentially unhealthy
emotional stimulation. 
Sometimes, then, it might be better to
leave emotional experiences unspoken. But
there may also be health benefits associated
with talking effectively about emotional
experiences, just as there could be health
costs in intellectualising or remaining
aloof. Psychologists have a role here, in
terms of educational work that might
eventually contribute to improving the
nation’s health.
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